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Statutes:

This Reply contains argument only. All Authorities are
included in the original Appeal Brief filed in this matter.

Cases:

This Reply contains argument on!), ,-111 Authorities are
included in the original Appeal Brief filed in this matter.
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ARGUMENT
1. Both the Employment Agreement and the Notice of Termination
Are Effective 15 Days from Delivery.
Appellee's argument accurately reflects that the sole question before
this Court concerns the date upon which the employment was breached. If
the employment contract was breached on December 24, 1997 when the
Notice of Termination became effective, then Appellant's lawsuit is timely
and this Court should set aside the Order granting Appellee's Motion to
Dismiss and allow this matter to continue to trial. If the employment
contract was breached on December 9, 1997 when the Notice of Termination
was presented to Appellant, then the statute of limitations bars recovery by
Appellant.
Appellee argues strenuously that the breach took place on the date the
Notice of Termination was presented to Appellant, stating that the breach
was final, definite and sure on such date. However, Appellee fails to
consider the plain language of the Notice of the Termination which clearly
states:
This letter is your written notice that we are
terminating the Independent Salesman Agreement that
we have with you effective 15 days from the above date
[December 9, 1997] Please prepare and submit to us a
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list of all pending unfinished business involving sales of
Company products.
This action is taken per section IU oi uie
Independent Salesman Agreement you signed on
1997. [emphasis added]

The above Notice comports with the Independent Salesman
Agreement which requires that Appellee give an employee 15 days advance
n^fi,Ni N^tsiv
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That the Notice of Termination was not effective on the date that it
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terminating Appellai
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Notice, but by its very terms, was effecting the termination in 15 days.
Thus, no breach occurs until December 24, 1997 when the termination of
einpK'Xcc .sci!ij;...;
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Second, Appellee had unfinished business for Appellant to complete
before he left the emplo\ wi Appellee. Appellant was requested, or required

involving sales of Appellee's products. Simpl)r put, Appellant was required
to finish up his business during the 15 day period of time. By the very
terms of tl: le Notice, Appellant was required to compile data, assemble
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report of all pending, unfinished business.

If Appellant was terminated on

the date of the presentation of the Notice, then Appellee could not have
demanded, required and expected Appellant to undertake the arduous task of
resolving the unfinished matters. However, Appellee, by the very terms of
its demands upon Appellant, did not believe the employment contract to be
terminated until December 24, 1997 and thus, it made the above strenuous
demands upon Appellant, still considering him to be an employee and
servant in the master-servant relationship (required to jump when ordered
and to heed when beckoned).
2. Reference to Appellee's Trial Court Memorandums to Support
Statements of Facts Should Be Stricken: While it is accepted law that for
purposes of Motions to Dismiss and their following appeals that factual
statements in complaints are assumed to be truthful, the same presumption
does not apply to Memoranda filed with respect to motions filed with the
trial court.
Thus, Appellees statements set forth in it's brief referring to factual
statements made in memoranda submitted to the trial court should not be
allowed to stand and should not be considered by this Court.
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2. Appellee Misquotes Appellant's Statements: On page 12 of
Appellee's brief, last paragraph, line 3, Appellee states:
At that time, Clarke was "rather unceremoniously
informed that Living no longer desires to associate with
him."
Appellee places a period at the end of the above quotation, as if the
above statement stands on its own. However, the above statement actually
states:
Clarke was given the notice of termination, instructed to
clean out his desk and marched out the front door of the
business, but was rather unceremoniously informed that
Living no longer desired to associate with him and that as
of 15 days from the date of the letter, or December 25,
1997, he was not to consider himself a part of the Living
family of employees. ( Attorney's Note: it appears that
the 25th date was an error and should have been the 24th.
Whether the actual date is the 24th or the 25th makes no
difference in the outcome of the case or this appeal)
If Appellee is to cite facts from a memorandum in support of its
position, it is only appropriate that the entire statement be referred to and not
just to a portion which is made to appear as a complete statement. The
above statement, as set, forth clearly illustrates that Appellant was given the
Notice of Termination, was told to leave the premises, but was under a
continuing obligation of servitude to Living as a part of the Living family of
employees up and until December 24, 1997. His discontinuance of
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association was not effective until December 24, 1997. He had work to do.
He had duties to fulfill and he continued to be a part of the family of
employees through December 24, 1997.
CONCLUSION
Appellee correctly discerns that the issue for resolution centers on the
event upon which the breach occurred. Appellee cites a number of cases,
most concerning employment discrimination rather than breach of an
employment contract. Those cases indicate that breach of the contract takes
place upon the date of the breach. But when is the breach? The breach in
this case took place not on the date of delivery of the notice of termination,
but rather it was "effective" 15 days from the date of delivery.
In addition, Appellant was required to finish up his pending business
and prepare and submit reports to Appellee as part of his final duties as an
employee. For 15 days after the delivery of the Notice, Appellant continued
to be an employee, continued to report on the progress of his work,
continued to answer to a superior and continued under the aegis and
direction of Living.
Thus, there was no breach until the end of the 15 days and no cause of
action arose or accrued until the 15 days elapsed.
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Appellant prays that the lower court's Order of Dismissal be set aside
and that the matter be allowed to continue to trial on the merits.
Dated this

(_ day of December, 2004.

ROBERT D. ROSE
Attorney for Appellant
PROOF OF SERVICE
I certify that I delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Appellant's Brief to:
Heidi E. C. Leithead
Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless
185 South State, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

on the
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day of December, 2004.
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